Is there light at the end of the tunnel?
In Socrates’s imagining, there comes a time when every voter must make a choice between a doctor, harsh yet truthful, or a chef, promising some bounty of delicious food if only they are given the power to do so. The seeming disparity between the options is the fundamental appeal of the populist; why deal with the sober realities of governance when you can promise everything to everyone. By now populist politicians have become a fact of life. Stories of Hungary’s Victor Orban, Germany’s Sahra Wagenknecht, Donald Trump’s recent reelection have dominated the news cycles of many western papers. Often with contradictory policy platforms that don’t fit neatly into the traditional left/right binary, populist policies are like a great feast, there’s always something for everyone. Although generally more infamous for their social policies, which generally lean xenophobic and right wing, it is the economic policies, a strange mix of right and left, that have the potential for serious long-term damage.
The Land of Milk and Honey
Despite America’s dominance in the world of anything economy related, beating the European Union on both straight and PPP adjusted GDP, and despite ~100 million less people, most Europeans do not envy the worklife of their cross Atlantic neighbors. What’s the point of 25% more in wages when one doesn’t have enough vacation time to use it? Despite this self-confidence, European leaders worry; in a multipolar world, an economy that is ‘good enough’ may not in fact be good enough. The reactions to this have varied. Some, such as France’s Macron, have fallen back on traditional Keynesian economics, government investment and expansionary fiscal policies during bad times, and laissez faire policy during the good. The hope is that further integration of the European economies will provide a sufficient catalyst for more growth. Yet after the 2008 crisis and the 2010 eurozone crisis, which necessitated bailouts of countries such as Ireland, Portugal and most famously Greece, unease has taken the place of optimism. Add in a refugee crisis in 2015, and it is little surprise the makeup of the parties that arose in this time. The alt-right AfD in Germany, the hyper nationalist Rassemblement National in French, or the self avowed Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn in Greece. Rather than promoting a coherent policy, many espouse that simply removing immigrants, illegal or otherwise is the solution to any number of problems. Likewise fighting ‘globalization’, meant more as a nebulous boogeyman than as an attack on international trade per se, is the solution to economic woes.
Although attacks on mosques and violent rhetoric generally dominate the public imagination, it is not only the right that has wormed into the mainstream politics through populism. Parties such as Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, in Ireland or the humbly named Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany, espouse much of the same anti-globalist rhetoric, only choosing bankers and business as the enemy of the people over migrants and Islam. Right or left, both are hostile to European integration, hostile to liberal economic policies, and hostile, it would seem, to reasonable governance. And yet they are popular; in the 2024 EU elections PfE, the primary far right party, won the third most seats in the European Parliament. Combined with ESN and the right wing of ECR, both conservative to rightwing populist groupings, this block holds nearly a quarter of available seats.
It is also in the EU where the strongest pushback is found. Former Italian Prime Minister and darling of European centrists, Mario Draghi’s’ so-called ‘The future of European competitiveness’ report (called the Draghi Report for short) goes against the prevailing wind of populism. Rather than scoff at their American partners, Draghi suggests learning and using some American policy measures, without letting go of European strengths. A chronic lack of investment in the economy has done more to hurt wage growth amongst workers than immigrants or the specter of ‘globalization’. The gap in productivity across the Euro-Atlantic area is more likely a product of poor incentives for European companies to innovate alongside a lack of sufficient integration in the capital market, rather than a plot orchestrated by elites to destroy the west. The report will not usher in any major change in popular sentiment. Few outside the halls of power will know of it, and even fewer will read all 400 pages of it, but hopefully, as Mr. Draghi wrote for the economist, “Europe can find the strength to reform”. With progress, there is hope that as the conditions that breed populism fade, so will populism itself.
I was born in New York, but moved to Europe as a teenager. I am currently a second year BEMACS Student. I enjoy writing as a means by which to record and disseminate the things I find interesting such as politics, history and culture.
