Ten years ago, on the 29th of October 2015, the Chinese Communist Party officially announced the end of the one-child policy, an experiment in demographic engineering destined to reshape the economy, culture and society of the Asian giant.
But where did it all begin?
In countries like Italy, where the demographic crisis is at the center of public attention, there is a strong tendency to view a growing population as an inevitably positive development. However, the equation “more people = stronger economic performance” does not always hold true.
By the late 1960s, China’s leaders started to recognize that a steady rise in births could strain the nation’s resources. While seeking to improve living conditions and maintain public support, the Communist Party deeply feared an increase in poverty. This concern was fueled by neo-Malthusian theories, which reinterpreted the ideas of Thomas Malthus, the 18th-century English economist, suggesting that during periods of expansion, population grows faster than the economy and must therefore be controlled to prevent a continual rise in poverty.
Moreover, the then-leader Mao Zedong aimed to make China a developed country with the necessary tools to compete with other powers. To achieve this goal, he viewed education as essential and strived to moderate the growth trend of births to invest more in each student.
Thus, late marriages began to be encouraged, abortion and contraceptives were reintroduced in hospitals and in 1970 the family planning campaign “wan, xi, shao” (late, spaced, few) was launched: marry late to allow more time for education, have children spaced apart to devote adequate attention to each and have few children to prevent overpopulation.
After Mao, the leadership of Deng Xiaoping became even more rigid. The leader, known for opening China to markets and international enterprises, introduced the one-child policy in 1979 to stop the uncontrolled growth of the population.
The implementation of the policy was marked by severe coercive measures, which over the years were condemned by various international organizations defending human rights. The state imposed mandatory medical check-ups on all women of childbearing age and those who tried to evade these controls risked heavy fines, loss of employment or even revocation of their residence permits. However, in rural areas there was strong resistance: fertility was seen as a valuable resource, not only because of the patriarchal tradition favoring male heirs, but also because male labor was considered essential for agricultural work. This led to protests and acts of violence against officials who enforced abortions and sterilizations. Despite a few concessions granted to certain couples during the 1980s, coercive measures continued.
Why did China decide to change course ten years ago?
By the early 1980s, a disproportionate increase in the number of males compared to females was observed. “Over time, sex-selective abortions, driven by a preference for sons, resulted in millions of so-called “missing girls” and a surplus of men, resulting in the demographic phenomenon known as “marriage squeeze”, which can further lower fertility by limiting the number of potential unions” – explains Margherita Moretti, postdoctoral researcher in demography at Bocconi University.
Moreover, the decline in births resulted in a lack of young workers and growing economic difficulties, turning China into an aging society facing serious challenges to its pension system. “The one-child policy, combined with rising life expectancy, produced the so-called 4-2-1 family structure, with one child responsible for two parents and four grandparents, concentrating most caregiving duties on a single individual” – notes Dr. Moretti – “Moreover, the growing gap between contributors and beneficiaries, as fewer young workers support a rapidly aging population, could strain China’s welfare systems and threaten both social protection and long-term economic sustainability”.
The first significant changes to the one-child policy occurred in 2013, when the measures were relaxed, allowing couples in which at least one spouse was an only child to have two children. However, the results were disappointing, as only a small share of eligible families actually chose to have a second child.
It was only on the 29th of October 2015, that the Chinese Communist Party officially announced the end of this experiment, allowing all couples to have two children. The measure, officially come into effect in 2016, aimed to counter the aging of the population and rebalance the ratio between men and women.
But what has happened in these years?
Surprisingly, the new policy did not have a strong impact.
Although the reform initially seemed successful, its positive effects quickly wore off. Several scholars pointed out that the measure came too late: the mentality and habits shaped by three decades of demographic control were already deeply rooted. Moreover, younger generations, being more educated, urbanized and focused on careers, tend to marry later. At the same time, the significant costs of raising children, especially in major cities where housing and living expenses are high, have further discouraged couples from having large families.
In 2023, with its 1.4 billion inhabitants, China lost its position as the world’s most populous country to India and, according to the United Nations, could decline to 1.3 billion by 2050 and fall below 800 million by 2100. In addition, in 2024, births were lower than deaths for the third consecutive year.
With the goal of reducing the cost of parenthood and reversing the demographic crisis, in 2025 the Asian giant introduced an annual bonus of 3,600 yuan (about 430 euros) for each child under the age of three, as part of a new national plan to support birth rates.
“Despite investments in family-friendly policies, few countries have successfully reversed fertility decline by suggesting that low fertility is less a policy failure than part of a broader social transformation” – argues Margherita Moretti – “As some have suggested, rather than pursuing pronatalist strategies, governments might better focus their efforts on addressing challenges like inequality, climate change, weak welfare systems and policies that foster healthy ageing and long-term sustainability”.
China remains the world’s leading industrial power and a central player on the international stage, yet the fear of overpopulation that dominated fifty years ago has now given way to a fear of demographic decline. The final question remains: how long can the country sustain its economic strength and global influence as its population ages and its workforce continues to shrink?
