In today’s edition of the Monday Briefing, we come to the Italian government shaky weeks after the Referendum on the Judiciary. In Costa Rica, the President folds to US demands in immigration, while the world’s energy supplies are dwindling without the Gulf oil. Back in Europe, Orban plays all the cards he has left ahead of the next general elections.
Spotlight: What is happening to Giorgia Meloni?
Since her election in September 2022, Giorgia Meloni has brought remarkable stability to the Italian government. Her right-wing coalition, closely tied together in a comfortable majority, has been virtually unchallenged for three years and a half. As of the day of writing, Meloni’s government is the third longest in the history of the Italian republic, soon to overcome the second (Berlusconi’s 2008-11) and on track to achieve first place before the end of the legislative term in 2027. And yet something has changed in the last two weeks, and the aura of invincibility that surrounded Italy’s first female prime minister had collapsed.
On the 23rd of March, Meloni’s government was badly defeated in national referendum regarding the organization of the Judiciary. The very technical constitutional reform had been approved by both chambers of parliament, controlled by the current coalition, back in October 2025, but had to go through a public consultation due to the lack of a two-thirds majority. The divided opposition rallied around the “NO” decision, while the government tried to push the reform through. The electoral campaign was characterized by sensationalism and polarizing (and rather cheap) propaganda, with both sides claiming completely made-up effects to a very small and uninfluential reform. The opposition tried to frame the vote as a popularity check for Meloni, and many voters perceived it as such. In the end, the “NO” won by 53% to 47%, with an exceptionally high turnout.
Events unfolded rather quickly in the following days, as the government coalition looked for scapegoats. Figures within the Ministry of Justice (though not Minister Nordio himself) resigned in the following days, also due to the alleged connections to an ongoing scandal. Later in the same week. Meloni requested the resignation of Minister of Tourism Daniela Santanchè, long criticized by the opposition for her conflicts of interest but hardly involved in the electoral defeat in the referendum. Another major leader in the Coalition, Vice President of Forza Italia Maurizio Gasparri, left his leading post in the Senate Majority, as the party went through an internal reorganization.
Meloni conceded defeat in the Referendum but is privately trying to tighten up the ranks of her government for the last year of mandate. Although the legislative term expires in October of 2027, it is entirely possible that early elections in spring of the same year could be held, maybe in conjunction with a wide set of administrative elections that include the cities of Milano and Roma. To prepare for the next election, Meloni’s cabinet has started to draft a new electoral law, dubbed immediately “stabilicum” (following this weird Italian tradition of adding um at the end of words and calling as such the electoral law) that would substitute the current Rosatellum (again, weird). Although the text is still in the works, the law is going to favor large coalitions and probably entail a generous majority prize for the winning coalition over 40% of the votes. How the Italian political system will react to this paradigm shift is yet to be seen, but certainly Meloni has her eye on the prize of not only completing a full term in office, something that has never happened, but also being confirmed again for the next five years.
World News
Costa Rica Agrees to Accept Deported Migrants from the US
by Diego de Carvalho
On March 23rd, Costa Rica announced a deal to accept third country deportees from the United States, becoming the newest Central American country to cede to American demands on immigration. A third country deportee is one that is deported from the United States to a somewhere different than its home country. The deal, signed by President Rodrigo Chaves, will send to the country per month 25 migrants that are not of Costa Rican nationality.
The move is another step in Central American diplomacy towards the Trump administration, which has treated the region as a crucial part of its immigration policy. 68% percent of unauthorized migrants to the US in 2023 were from Mexico and Central America, while the 12% who came from South America often crossed through Central America on the way to the USA.
Many of the other countries in the region — including Panama, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize — had already struck similar deals to take in third country immigrants, a trend that has alarmed human rights experts around the world. The most egregious of these cases is El Salvador, which has put deportees from the US into its infamous high-security prisons, where torture and humans rights abuses are widespread.
Even beyond migration, Costa Rica has aligned itself to the emerging right-wards shift in the Americas. In February, it elected president the conservative Laura Fernández Delgado. Last month, it joined Shield of Americas, a military cooperation alliance led by the United States, that includes other bastions of Latin America’s growing far-right such as Argentina and El Salvador.
Middle East Conflict: An Energy Crises with Familiar Responses
by Lisa Tomaselli
As we enter the sixth week of the Middle East conflict, global tensions continue to rise. From an economic perspective, the main concern is the shortage of primary energy resources following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, described by the IEA Executive Director as “the greatest threat to global energy security in history”.
Governments are largely responding through a familiar pattern, seeking immediate relief. Across Asia, countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines have introduced remote working policies, while Egypt has imposed early closures on commercial activity. In Europe, where gas prices have risen by roughly 70% and oil by 50%, measures range from fuel rationing in Slovenia to jet fuel restrictions in Italy.
In the United States, Georgia’s 60-day gas tax suspension, now under consideration in other states, appears emblematic of this short-term approach. By lowering prices, such measures risk increasing demand, potentially worsening the very shortage they are meant to address.
A similar situation unfolded during the oil shocks of the 1970s following the Yom Kippur War. Then, too, emergency measures were introduced in response to sudden supply constraints, which later coincided with broader shifts in mobility, from reduced speed limits to renewed investment in public transport and cycling infrastructure in countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark. As noted by Mohamed Mezghani, secretary general of the International Association of Public Transport, crises of this kind have at times been seen not only as disruptions, but also as moments that can prompt change. Whether the current disruption will lead to comparable shifts remains to be seen.
European News
Explosives found in a Serbian gas pipeline: did Orbán stage the incident to consolidate his power?
“Ukraine has been for years trying to cut off Europe from Russian energy.” Hungary’s PM V. Orbán makes this statement and divides the public opinion, that increasingly targets him as being the key perpetrator of a blame-shifting campaign against Ukraine. The latter claim was corroborated on Sunday, April 5th, 2026, when Orbán said he was informed by Serbia’s President of “explosives of devastating power” being found near a pipeline transporting Russian gas to Hungary and central-eastern Europe. Affiliates of the opposition party Tisza, guided by its main representative Péter Magyar, are questioning the nature of such reported incident, which may non-coincidentally have been signaled one week before Hungarians are due to cast their votes to decide on the next Prime Minister.
Although Serbia’s President informed Orbán of the pipeline case, he still made sure to conceal the origins of the found explosives, limiting his statement to the praising of the intelligence services who “did a good job”. Magyar’s opposition party revealed they were expecting some staged incident to occur on Easter involving the help of Russia and Serbia; Tisza’s leader is indeed aware of posing a real threat to Orbán’s hold onto the power, causing the 16-year unbeaten PM to spread intra-Hungarian fear about a possible terrorist action that could be conveniently blamed onto Ukraine. M. Rahman, Europe’s managing director at Eurasia Group, has himself stated that Brussels and EU capitals “have been expecting a false-flag operation by Orbán – citing a national security risk – as grounds to postpone next Sunday’s elections that he looks set to lose.”
On Sunday, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry has dismantled any accuse that linked Kyiv to the incident, rather suggesting a false-flag operation orchestrated by Russia as part of Moscow’s plan to interfere in Hungary’s elections. Next week’s decision may be historically decisive for determining the country’s political destiny, which is now torn between the use of propaganda to consolidate Orbán’s Russian and U.S.-backed position, and the several allegations advanced by the Opposition, which highlights Orban’s corruption in blaming Ukraine and self-sponsoring as the suited leader to handle any of its attacks.
Every week, your TiL Monday Briefing 🗞: you better read it with a cup of coffee! ☕️
Head of the Monday Briefing column: Pietro Ferrari. Current writing staff: Vatsal Aggarwal, Cristiana Murè. Cartoons by Polina Mednikova. The Monday Briefing column was established in its current form in 2021 by Bojan Zeric.
