How far are we willing to defend freedom when it protects choices we dislike? In Defending the Undefendable, Walter E. Block challenges some of our deepest moral beliefs by separating what is immoral from what should be illegal. His work forces us to face an uncomfortable question: are we autonomous agents or do we need protection from ourselves?
Walter E. Block, born in Brooklyn in 1941, is one of the most influential and controversial libertarian economists in the United States. A prominent representative of the Austrian School of economics, he has explored a radical view of the free market, private property, and the reduction of government intervention in the economy. He is best known for his book Defending the Undefendable, in which he applies the fundamental principles of libertarianism in a particularly radical way.
In this work, Block argues in favour of the legitimacy of certain socially stigmatised figures and the practices they engage in, such as prostitution, usury, speculation, and drug dealing. He argues that, as the exchanges in which these individuals are involved are consensual and non-coercive, they should not be regarded as illegitimate. They may be immoral, perhaps, but must not be illegal. The ideological foundation of this position is the libertarian principle of non-aggression, according to which it is unjustifiable to initiate aggression against non-aggressors, that is, against those who do not themselves initiate violence. It is also important to clarify that, when referring to the term “aggression”, Block does not include dogmatism, competitiveness, adventurousness, contentiousness, and antagonism. Instead, as he spiecifies, “what is meant by aggression is the use of violence, such as that which takes place in murder, rape, robbery, or kidnapping.” (Preface, Defending the Undefendable).
The author meticulously applies this principle to many marginal, controversial, and socially condemned occupations. In each one of the cases he analyses, his aim is to firstly prove that the individuals working such occupations do not initiate violence or coercion against others. Following this premise, Block argues that these activities often produce a social or economic benefit and that their prohibition causes harm not only to those who are directly involved, but also to third parties. His analyses are very specific and tackle each case in a detailed and systematic manner. Rather than attempting to defend the morality of these professions, Block focuses on a narrower question: whether the state is justified in using coercion to prevent voluntary and consensual exchanges.
It is crucial for the understanding of the book that we distinguish between morality and legality. Block does not claim that the behaviours he discusses are ethical or worthy of imitation; he, indeed, argues this cannot be a sufficient justification for legal prohibition. According to him, an action may be objectionable from a moral perspective, while still falling outside of the sphere of a legitimate state intervention. Through this distinction, Block constructs arguments that are deliberately uncomfortable and that force to separate personal judgement from legal legitimacy.
This work, in all of its controversy, is intellectually quite relevant. Its value lies not only in the rigorous logic that Block applies to the analysis of each individual case, pushing the seemingly reasonable principle of non-aggression to its most radical implications; it also lies in the underlying question that makes the entire work so controversial, that is, the one regarding the role of the government in regulating individual behaviour.
I think the reason why Block’s arguments are very much debated in so many economic and philosophical circles is the uncertainty, or better yet the entrenched disagreement, regarding the state’s position. The reason why so many people feel that Block is fundamentally wrong is not his logic. In abstract terms, it is not hard to accept the illegitimacy of an aggression towards a non-aggressor, even when it is carried out by the state. The real difficulty seems to emerge when this principle is consistently applied to concrete situations. Why, then, is it that the analysis of this principle’s consequences and implications feels so wrong to so many people?
This may be a consequence of fundamentally different conceptions of the state. Is the role of the state that of legally protecting autonomous individuals by intervening only when one person violates the rights of another? Or should it play a paternalistic role through the protection of citizens from the choices that society considers immoral or degrading?
Block’s position is clear. In the introduction to his work, he explicitly distinguishes between defending the legality of certain occupations and defending their morality. The activities he discusses are neither morally righteous, not necessarily, nor does he ask the reader to admire those who engage in them. He claims, instead, that if an activity is voluntary and non-coercive there is no sufficient justification for legal prohibition according to the principle of non-aggression.
This argument quickly exposes the limits of personal and collective morality. If, according to what the majority considers immoral, we allow the state to intervene through its legal power, then individual liberty becomes dependent on prevailing societal values. This, from a libertarian perspective, creates an extremely dangerous precedent: the same coercive power can be used to suppress unconventional or unpopular behaviours of minority groups.
Undoubtedly, Block’s thesis raises important objections. The main one regards the worry that apparently voluntary exchanges may not be genuinely free, especially when poverty, addiction, inequality, or lack of alternatives push the individual towards specific choices. Again, we are brought back to how we perceive the individual. Is the citizen free and autonomous, and capable of making decisions, or should he or she be protected from others and, more importantly, themselves?
The power of this book lies in how it exposes one’s true commitment to the principle of freedom. The debate it fuels does not concern the individual cases taken into consideration. Instead, it poses important questions that regard how much we as a society are willing to defend freedom, even when it makes us uncomfortable. The underlying belief in Defending the Undefendable is that people’s choices are to be respected, as long as they do not initiate violence towards others. The reason why I believe this notion to be so relevant is that it treats every character involved as an autonomous and intelligent person, who is entirely capable of making decisions for themselves. Whether this is a right or wrong assumption, I cannot say. Still, I believe it is crucial to question the way we perceive our fellow citizens. If we are fundamentally unable to protect ourselves and defend our interests, it makes sense that the state must protect us from our decisions. The question is: is that what we want to be? And, perhaps more importantly, is that what we are capable of being?
I'm a first year BAI student, with a particular interest in the intersections between technology and the human experience. Outside of my studies, I'm passionate about music, philosophy, and mental health.
